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IMPLICATIONS OF WORK EFFORT AND DISCRETION FOR EMPLOYEE WELL-BEING 
AND CAREER-RELATED OUTCOMES: AN INTEGRATIVE ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Abstract 
 
How does work effort affect employee outcomes? The authors bridge distinct literatures on the 
well-being versus career-related implications of work effort by analyzing the relation of overtime 
work and work intensity to both types of outcomes. They also extend examination of the role of 
discretion in modifying the effects of work effort from well-being to career-related outcomes. 
Using data from the fifth and sixth European Working Conditions Surveys, the authors show that 
greater work effort relates strongly to reduced well-being and modestly to inferior career-related 
outcomes, while discretion may attenuate these adverse implications. Even with discretion, work 
intensity generally is a stronger predictor of unfavorable outcomes than overtime work. 
Implications include the need for employees to become aware of the broader limitations of 
excessive work effort, for employers to give discretion when viable, and for public policy to 
devise strategies that help limit the adverse consequences of work intensity.  
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In 2016, over five million UK employees reported regularly working unpaid overtime 
(Trades Union Congress 2017), while about 36 percent of Dutch employees reported often or 
always working at a high pace (CBS 2017). Figures such as these exemplify a tendency of many 
employees to supply high levels of work effort on a frequent basis. A fundamental question is 
how work effort is related to individual consequences, both in terms of employee well-being as 
well as career-related outcomes. Answers to this question are important because they may inform 
employees’ labor supply decisions and they can assist employers and governments in designing 
strategies that stimulate productive and sustainable effort in the workforce. 
Work effort includes “overtime work” and “work intensity”, where the former is the 
amount of time an employee works in excess of normal hours, while the latter is the level of 
effort supplied per unit of working time. A broad and multidisciplinary literature has studied the 
well-being consequences of both types of work effort, while a small and separate literature in 
economics has focused on overtime work and its career-related implications. Our first objective is 
to bridge these literatures by offering an integrative analysis of the implications of overtime work 
and work intensity for employee well-being and career-related outcomes. Our second objective is 
to examine how the level of discretion given to employees influences the relationship between 
work effort and employee outcomes, where “discretion” means the freedom to decide how and 
when to carry out the work. We do so in the spirit of the ‘job demands-control model’ (Karasek 
1979), which suggests that a focus on work effort (often referred to as ‘job demands’) is truncated 
without simultaneous attention to the discretion afforded to employees. The intuition is that 
discretion serves as a buffer that can alleviate the possibly adverse implications of work effort for 
employee well-being. Here, we extend this idea of an interaction between work effort and 
discretion by using it not just to predict well-being but also career-related outcomes, a relation 
thus far underemphasized in the literature. 
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We use micro data on a random sample of 51,895 employees from across 36 European 
countries, drawn from the fifth and sixth European Working Conditions Surveys (Eurofound 
2010, 2015). Our data set covers all industries and occupations and contains detailed information 
on types of work effort, types of discretion, and indicators of well-being and career-related 
outcomes. We estimate models using overtime work and work intensity, as well as interactions 
with types of discretion, to predict indicators of well-being (i.e., stress, fatigue, and job 
satisfaction) and career-related outcomes (i.e., career prospects, job security, and recognition). 
We control for a wide range of factors that may determine both work effort and discretion as well 
as employee consequences, and our results hold up across alternative model specifications. In 
subsample analyses, we document similarities and differences among the estimates between high-
skilled white collars and low-skilled blue collars. 
We contribute to scholarship on the consequences of work effort by bridging the distinct 
literatures on well-being and career-related implications. We assess the two types of outcomes in 
one and the same sample of employees, allowing us to offer original insight into the comparative 
relevance of overtime work and work intensity for predicting well-being versus career-related 
outcomes. Additionally, by extending the interactive effects of work effort and discretion from 
well-being to career-related implications, we provide new and more comprehensive evidence on 
the role of discretion in conditioning work effort associations with employee outcomes. 
Background 
Work Effort and Employee Outcomes 
Work effort has two dimensions (Green 2001; Kristensen, Bjorner, Christensen, and Borg 
2004). The first is extensive work effort, or the duration of work. Overtime work is one prevalent 
aspect of extensive work effort and captures the amount of time an employee works in excess of 
normal hours. Both part-time and full-time employees can work overtime. The second dimension 
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of work effort is work intensity (sometimes referred to as ‘intensive work effort’), which has 
been defined as “the rate of physical and/or mental input to work tasks performed during the 
working day” (Green 2001: 56). Rather than referring to work duration, work intensity refers to 
the level of effort supplied per unit of working time. 
A large literature has studied the implications of overtime work and work intensity for 
employee well-being. The core idea is that work effort of either kind is associated with reduced 
well-being, through several mechanisms. Overtime work prolongs an employee’s exposure to 
workplace stressors and, by shortening the periods when an employee rests, decreases the ability 
to recover between working days (Sánchez 2017). Work intensity instead reduces or eliminates 
gaps between tasks during which the body or mind can rest, thus decreasing the employee’s 
ability to recover during working days (Green 2001). A lack of recovery between or during 
working days may have cumulative effects because a fatigued employee requires progressively 
more effort to maintain adequate performance. 
While some studies find limited support for an association between overtime work and 
aspects of employee well-being (Robone, Jones, and Rice 2011; Wood and De Menezes 2011), 
the balance of the available evidence is that greater work effort is associated with symptoms of 
stress, anxiety, depression, and burnout (Sparks, Cooper, Fried, and Shirom 1997; Golden and 
Wiens-Tuers 2006; Virtanen et al. 2011), inferior work-life balance (Schieman, Milkie, and 
Glavin 2009; Green et al. 2013; Boxall and Macky 2014), increased sleep deprivation and fatigue 
(Belman and Monaco 2001; Cottini and Lucifora 2013), poorer self-reported mental health (Goh, 
Pfeffer, and Zenios 2016), as well as reduced job-related well-being (Green, Felstead, Gallie, and 
Inanc 2016). Consequently, available arguments and evidence lead us to expect that (I) overtime 
work and work intensity are negatively associated with employee well-being. 
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Further, a small and separate literature in economics has focused on overtime work and its 
career-related consequences for employees within the firm. One argument has been that 
employers might perceive employees who supply overtime as more committed and motivated. 
Thus, overtime work may be taken by employers as a signal of employee value, which helps 
them to prioritize which employees should receive more opportunities for career advancement, 
improved terms of employment, or recognition more generally (Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor 
1996; Holmstrom 1999). Consistent with this theory, some studies suggest that overtime work 
may be positively associated with future promotions and earnings within the firm (Francesconi 
2001; Pannenberg 2005; Anger 2008), both reflections of career advancement and recognition. 
Other evidence suggests that employees supplying more overtime might also be more likely to 
receive a permanent contract (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 2002), thus improving their terms 
of employment through greater job security. 
Others have argued that high effort levels might not be of a productive kind because work 
effort is subject to decreasing marginal returns (Chapman 1909; Green 2001, 2004b). Convergent 
with this idea, available evidence suggests that productivity decreases as working hours increase 
(Pencavel 2015), which can be attributed to the reduced opportunity for physical, mental, and 
emotional recovery associated with overtime work (Pencavel 2016; Sánchez 2017). Limited 
recovery in turn reduces the ability for sustained performance at a high cognitive level and 
increases the likelihood of mistakes, accidents, and injuries (e.g., Dembe, Erickson, Delbos, and 
Banks 2005; Folkard and Lombardi 2006). To the extent that such issues accumulate over time 
and become reflected in the quality of an employee’s work, they may reduce his or her career-
related opportunities. 
Studies of the relationship between work effort and career-related outcomes have 
overwhelmingly focused on overtime work rather than work intensity. Nevertheless, we suspect 
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that work intensity could have a signaling component similar to overtime work. Higher work 
intensity requires mental and/or physical input that can reflect employee value, commitment, or 
motivation, which may convey credible information to employers to the extent it is observable. 
Yet, if it cumulates to reduce quality, high work intensity might also be counterproductive like 
overtime work, which would harm career-related outcomes. 
Overall, arguments and available evidence would imply two opposing expectations 
regarding the career-related implications of work effort. If work effort more strongly signals 
employee value than it is self-limiting and counterproductive, then (IIa) overtime work and work 
intensity are positively associated with career-related outcomes. If, instead, work effort is self-
limiting and counterproductive more than it signals employee value, then (IIb) overtime work and 
work intensity are negatively associated with career-related outcomes. 
The Role of Discretion 
Work effort conceivably has direct implications for employees, yet all employees are not 
equally susceptible to its various consequences. Perhaps most prominently, a psychological 
literature on job strain has suggested that the consequences of work effort for well-being depend 
on “the discretion permitted the worker in deciding how to meet [job] demands” (Karasek 1979: 
285). Here, we build on and extend the intuition of an interaction between work effort and 
discretion by examining its implications not just for well-being but also career-related outcomes. 
We define discretion as an employee’s freedom to decide how and when to carry out his or her 
work (Ortega 2009a, 2009b; Moen et al. 2016).1 We first outline some evidence on the discretion 
association with employee outcomes and then discuss how discretion may modify the well-being 
and career-related implications of work effort. 
                                                 
    1 In the literature, discretion has also been referred to as autonomy (e.g., Hackman and Oldham 1975), decision 
latitude (e.g., Karasek 1979), or job control (e.g., Van Yperen and Hagedoorn 2003). 
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Employees with greater discretion report lower levels of stress (Henly and Lambert 2014) 
and increased job satisfaction and well-being (De Menezes and Kelliher 2017; Wheatley 2017), 
and they tend to be more involved and committed (Wood, Holman, and Stride 2006; Lyness, 
Gornick, Stone, and Grotto 2012). Furthermore, employees who have control over when to work 
experience less work-life conflict (Kelly, Moen, and Tranby 2011). Discretion has also been 
related to reduced turnover intentions, voluntary turnover, job insecurity, and dismissals (Wood 
et al. 2006; Batt and Colvin 2011; Avgar, Pandey, and Kwon 2012; Gallie, Felstead, Green, and 
Inanc 2017), as well as enhanced career success (Leslie, Manchester, Park, and Mehng 2012). 
 While the implications of discretion for well-being and career-related outcomes are 
compelling in and of themselves, our interest is in the role of discretion in modifying the 
consequences of work effort. With respect to well-being, the ‘job demands-control model’ 
(Karasek 1979) suggests that discretion serves as a buffer that can alleviate the possibly adverse 
implications of work effort and so discretion should be of particular relevance to those employees 
supplying higher levels of effort. Discretion implies the opportunity to expend effort in ways and 
at times that are relatively more convenient for an employee. Therefore, work effort, whether 
overtime work or work intensity, may have less adverse well-being implications in employees 
with discretion. Illustrative evidence includes the finding that discretion is associated with 
reduced fatigue in nurses with highly demanding jobs (Van Yperen and Hagedoorn 2003); that 
the decline in well-being observed in the UK during the 1990s was “associated with a 
combination of rising work effort and declining task discretion” (Green 2004b: 616); and that, in 
a sample of European employees, work intensity is more adversely associated with job 
satisfaction in employees without discretion (Lopes, Lagoa, and Calapez 2014). 
Discretion may also affect the way in which work effort translates to career-related 
outcomes, a relation thus far underemphasized in the literature. Discretion implies the freedom to 
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adapt work in ways and to times when an employee believes his or her anticipated added value is 
greatest. As such, discretion may help an employee ease the progressive tension between work 
effort and the quality of output (Singh 2000). Recent findings provide indirect evidence 
consistent with such a relation, by showing that discretion may increase effort (Lott and Chung 
2016; Beckmann, Cornelissen, and Kräkel 2017). This outcome has been interpreted largely as 
reflecting voluntary effort on the part of the employee: discretion may motivate greater work 
effort as an act of reciprocation to the employer (Kelliher and Anderson 2010) and it may 
increase the anticipated value of additional effort (Green 2004a; Beckmann et al. 2017). In either 
case, discretion-induced effort is typically interpreted as relatively more productive compared to 
a counterfactual increase in effort without discretion. Therefore, discretion may strengthen the 
positive signal generated through higher levels of work effort, while also curtailing its self-
limiting and counterproductive tendencies. 
Overall, the arguments and available evidence on the interaction between work effort and 
discretion lead us to expect, first, that (III) work effort is less negatively associated with employee 
well-being in employees with more discretion. Second, we also expect that (IV) work effort is 
associated with better—either more positive or less negative—career-related outcomes in 
employees with more discretion. 
Occupational Differences 
One relevant question concerns whether differences exist across occupations in how types 
of effort are associated with employee outcomes, and how discretion modifies such associations. 
High-skilled white collars are more likely to use overtime work to signal their value (Landers et 
al. 1996; Schieman and Glavin 2016) and may often feel they do so by choice (Michel 2011; 
Empson 2017). Instead, low-skilled blue collars may be more prone to involuntary pressures for 
intensive work, in part because they tend to have less discretion compared to high-skilled white 
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collars (Kossek and Lautsch 2018). Thus, overtime associations with well-being and career-
related outcomes might be relatively more favorable in higher-level occupations. Moreover, 
given the lesser prevalence of discretion in lower-level occupations, perhaps low-skilled blue 
collars that do have discretion benefit disproportionally relative to high-skilled white collars. We 
treat these issues as open empirical questions and explore them after our main analysis. 
Method 
Data and Sample 
We analyze a pooled cross section of employees drawn from the fifth and sixth European 
Working Conditions Surveys (EWCSs), carried out by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in 2010 and 2015, respectively. The EWCSs 
survey stratified random samples of employees through (face-to-face) interviews that cover issues 
like work effort, work organization, well-being, and careers. Prior waves of this survey have been 
used regularly in the literature, for example, by Green and McIntosh (2001) to study work 
intensification in Europe; Ortega (2009a, 2009b) to study discretion; and Avgoustaki (2016) to 
study the antecedents of extensive work effort. 
Across the 2010 and 2015 waves of the EWCS, a total of 87,666 individuals were 
interviewed, covering 34 countries in 2010—i.e., the EU 27, Albania, Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Norway, and Turkey, and 35 countries 
in 2015—i.e., the EU 28, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey. Before pooling the two waves, we imposed a small 
number of sampling rules. We omitted self-employed individuals, individuals below 16 and 
above 65 years old, as well as individuals whose tenure in their firm exceeded 50 years. 
Subsequently, we applied list-wise deletion in cases of missing values on any of the variables 
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included in our model specifications. Together, these sampling rules produced our analysis 
sample, a pooled cross section of 51,895 employees from across 36 countries. 
Outcome Variables 
Employee Well-Being 
The variable Stress is measured with a categorical variable asking respondents to indicate, 
on a 5-point scale (4 = always; 3 = most of the time; 2 = sometimes; 1 = rarely; and 0 = never), 
the extent to which they experience stress in their work. Fatigue is measured with a question 
asking whether an employee suffered from overall fatigue in the past 12 months (1 = yes; 0 = no). 
Satisfaction is measured with a question asking respondents to indicate, on a 4-point scale (3 = 
very satisfied; 2 = satisfied; 1 = not very satisfied; 0 = not at all satisfied), whether on the whole 
they are satisfied with the working conditions in their main job. 
Career-Related Outcomes 
The variable Career is measured with a question that captures, on a 5-point scale (4 = 
strongly agree; 3 = agree; 2 = neither agree nor disagree; 1 = disagree; and 0 = strongly disagree), 
whether an employee’s job offers good prospects for career advancement. Security is measured 
with a question that asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with 
the statement that they might lose their job in the next six months (4 = strongly disagree; 3 = 
disagree; 2 = neither agree nor disagree; 1 = agree; and 0 = strongly agree). The variable 
Recognition, available only in EWCS 2015, is measured with a question that asks respondents to 
indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement that they receive the 
recognition they deserve for their work. Recognition is captured on a 5-point scale (4 = strongly 
agree; 3 = agree; 2 = neither agree nor disagree; 1 = disagree; and 0 = strongly disagree). 
Explanatory Variables 
Work Effort 
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The variable Overtime measures how often an employee worked in his or her free time to 
meet work demands in the past 12 months (4 = daily; 3 = several times a week; 2 = several times 
a month; 1 = less often; 0 = never). We capture intensive work effort with two ordinal indicators 
measured on a 6-point scale (6 = all of the time; 5 = almost all of the time; 4 = around ¾ of the 
time; 3 = around half of the time; 2 = around ¼ of the time; 1 = almost never; and 0 = never). The 
first indicator captures whether an employee’s job involves working at very high speed and the 
second whether the job involves working to tight deadlines. Factor analysis shows that the two 
load onto one factor, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78, and so we define the variable Work 
intensity as the average of scores on the two indicators. 
Discretion 
We capture discretion with two variables, one for work discretion and another for 
discretion over one’s schedule. Similar to Avgoustaki (2016), we measure the former, Work 
discretion, as the average of three dichotomous indicators (1 = yes; 0 = no) of an employee’s 
discretion to choose the order of tasks, methods of work, and the rate or speed of work. We 
measure the latter, Schedule discretion, as the average of two indicators on an employee’s 
discretion to adapt or entirely determine their working hours (1 = yes; 0 = no) and take breaks (1 
= sometimes or always; 0 = rarely or never). 
Controls 
We control for a large number of factors that may confound associations among work 
effort, discretion, and outcomes. Evidence suggests that human resource practices (other than 
discretion) are associated with effort (Avgoustaki 2016) and the provision of discretion 
(Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce 1998; Ortega 2009a, 2009b). We control for four such practices: 
training, task rotation, productivity pay, and teamwork. We capture training with three dummy 
variables (1 = yes; 0 = no) for the types of training employees have undergone during the past 12 
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months: Employer-provided training (i.e., training paid for or provided by the employer), 
Employee-funded training (i.e., training paid for by the employee), and On-the-job training. Task 
rotation captures whether an employee’s job involves rotating tasks, Productivity pay captures 
whether employees receive piece rate or other productivity payments, and Teamwork captures 
whether employees perform part of their work in a team. All three are dummies (1 = yes; 0 = no). 
Additional controls include dichotomous variables (1 = yes; 0 = no) capturing whether 
employee remuneration includes payment for overtime (Paid overtime), whether an employee’s 
pace of work is dependent on work done by colleagues (Pace of work dependent on colleagues), 
and whether his or her pace of work depends on the speed of a machine or movement of a 
product (Pace of work dependent on equipment). We also control for uncertainty at work through 
Task uncertainty, which captures, on a 4-point scale (3 = very often, to 0 = never), how often 
employees must interrupt one task to take on a different, unforeseen task. We control for Male, a 
dummy variable (1 = male; 0 = female) that absorbs gender differences in working conditions 
and outcomes. To capture age-dependent well-being (Blanchflower and Oswald 2017) and proxy 
for work experience, we control for Age in years and Age squared, and Log firm tenure, the log 
of an employee’s tenure in the firm in years plus one. Employees with more responsibility may 
expend more effort and have more discretion and so we control for Log subordinates, the log of 
the number of people under an individual’s supervision plus one.2 
We also control for a broad range of fixed effects. We include fixed effects for 35 
countries, 16 NACE industry sections, four sectors (public sector, joint private-public sector, not-
for-profit sector, other; private sector omitted as reference), nine one-digit ISCO88 occupations, 
six one-digit ISCED education levels, five types of employment contracts (indefinite, fixed-term, 
                                                 
    2 We take the log to address positive skew in the distributions of tenure and subordinates. 
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temporary employment agency contract, apprenticeship or other training scheme, no contract; 
other contract omitted as reference), and two establishment size categories (10-249 employees 
and 250+ employees; 2-9 employees omitted as reference). In models for all outcomes except 
Recognition, which is available only for 2015, we include a fixed effect for survey year (1 = 
2015; 0 = 2010). Table A.1 in the Online Appendix provides a comprehensive list of definitions 
and sources for all outcome and explanatory variables. 
Main Results 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for each survey wave separately as well as the pooled 
sample and provides correlations among the study variables in the pooled sample. From 2010 to 
2015, the means suggest noteworthy increases in career prospects and job security, moderate 
increases in Stress, Satisfaction, and Work intensity, and a reduction in Overtime. 
[[Table 1 near here]] 
Among the six outcomes, Fatigue is a dummy variable and all others are ordinal variables. 
Therefore, we estimate binary logit models for Fatigue and ordered logit models for all other 
outcomes, using the explanatory variables described in the previous section. We report beta 
coefficients corresponding to the log of the unstandardized odds ratio. We also report odds ratios 
(OR) to examine the magnitude of the estimates. The explanatory variables differ in their 
underlying measurement scales and distributions. Therefore, we report odds ratios for an increase 
in each predictor from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile, allowing for an appropriate 
comparison of effect sizes.3 We obtain robust standard errors clustered by country-industry pairs 
to account for the possibility that survey responses are more similar among employees working in 
                                                 
    3 Relevant percentiles are given in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix. 
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a given industry in a given country. When unaccounted for, such non-independence may 
artificially reduce standard errors, increasing the probability of Type-I errors. 
Overtime and Work Intensity Estimates 
[[Table 2 near here]] 
Table 2 shows the regression estimates that we use to assess the coefficients for Overtime 
and Work intensity. Unreported regression diagnostics indicate that collinearity is well within 
acceptable limits for all the key variables. After adjusting for a large number of covariates, 
Overtime is associated with increased Stress and Fatigue and decreased Satisfaction, as well as 
reduced levels of perceived career prospects, job security, and Recognition. Work intensity too is 
associated with increased Stress and Fatigue and decreased Satisfaction, as well as reduced levels 
of career prospects, job security, and Recognition. The coefficients are all precisely determined 
and so support expectations (I) and (IIb). The estimates provide no evidence for a positive 
association between types of work effort and the career-related outcomes. Thus, support is not 
found for expectation (IIa). These findings are consistent with prior evidence for a negative 
association between work effort and well-being (e.g., Golden and Wiens-Tuers 2006; Green et al. 
2016), while they also resonate with the idea that overtime work may in the margin decrease the 
quality of work (e.g., Pencavel 2015, 2016) and so is associated with inferior career-related 
outcomes. Our estimates extend available findings by uncovering this negative association 
between overtime work and career-related outcomes but also by offering evidence for a similarly 
negative association involving work intensity. 
 The odds ratios show that the work effort associations with employee outcomes are fairly 
substantial relative to most other predictors.4 The two measures of work effort are among the 
                                                 
    4 Odds ratios are directly comparable even within models because they are standardized to the 10-90 percentile 
range. Unstandardized odds ratios for the estimates in Table 2 (i.e., exp[β]) are given in Table A.3 in the Online 
Appendix. 
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most positively associated with Stress and Fatigue, and among the most negatively associated 
with Satisfaction, Security, and Recognition.5 Moreover, associations between the two effort 
variables and ones capturing employee well-being tend to be more substantial than associations 
with the career-related outcomes. Across the six models, work intensity generally is a stronger 
predictor of unfavorable outcomes than overtime work. Except in the model predicting Career, 
these differences are large and particularly pronounced in the model predicting Stress.6 Although 
prior studies have incorporated indicators of extensive and intensive effort to predict employee 
well-being (e.g., Wood and De Menezes 2011; Green et al. 2016), our focus on multiple types of 
outcomes supplies the novel insight that work intensity is important relative to overtime work for 
predicting both well-being and career-related outcomes. 
The well-being versus career-related implications of work effort have been studied in 
separate literatures and so we lack estimates that are comparable across both types of outcomes. 
Our models, estimated on one and the same sample of employees, help bridge this gap between 
literatures and so extend prior findings, by suggesting that work effort does not seem to be 
associated with a balance of favorable and unfavorable outcomes, where career-related outcomes 
compensate for reduced well-being. Work effort broadly predicts unfavorable outcomes. 
Work Effort Interactions with Discretion 
 Table 3 shows estimates for the interactions between dimensions of work effort and 
discretion, allowing us to assess the role of discretion in modifying the work effort associations 
with employee well-being (expectation (III)) and career-related outcomes (expectation (IV)). 
                                                 
    5 Negative associations have odds ratios below unity. Odds ratios closer to zero imply more-strongly negative 
associations. 
    6 Our measure for overtime work distinguishes employees by the frequency of overtime without reference to the 
duration of overtime. We have also undertaken an analysis using as an alternative measure for overtime work the 
number of days per month that an employee works more than ten hours. One might reasonably expect stronger 
effects for this measure because it uses an overtime threshold that is fairly conservative for most European countries 
(Avgoustaki 2016). Even compared to this alternative measure, work intensity generally is a stronger predictor of 
unfavorable well-being and career-related outcomes. These estimates are available from the authors on request. 
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Despite the introduction of four interaction effects in each of the models, unreported regression 
diagnostics indicate that collinearity remains within acceptable limits for all the key variables. 
[[Table 3 near here]] 
The interaction between Overtime and Work discretion is negatively associated with 
Stress and Fatigue and positively associated with Satisfaction, Security, and Recognition, while 
its association with Career is statistically insignificant. Coefficients for the interaction between 
Overtime and Schedule discretion are all indistinguishable from 0 at the 95% level. The 
interaction between Work intensity and Work discretion is positively associated with 
Satisfaction, Career, and Recognition, while its associations with Stress, Fatigue, and Security are 
statistically insignificant. Finally, the interaction between Work intensity and Schedule discretion 
is negatively associated with Fatigue and positively associated with Satisfaction and Career, 
while its associations with Stress, Security, and Recognition are statistically insignificant. 
The statistically significant estimates in Table 3 are consistent with our expectations. 
Associations between work effort and employee well-being are less negative in employees with 
more discretion (particularly Work discretion), while in such employees associations between 
work effort and career-related outcomes are also relatively more favorable. These findings 
provide a measure of support for expectations (III) and (IV). These findings expand available 
evidence by showing that the interaction between work effort and discretion predicts not just 
well-being, as in previous studies building on Karasek (1979). Discretion also improves the 
association between work effort and career-related outcomes. 
In Table 2, we established that work intensity generally is a stronger predictor of 
unfavorable outcomes than overtime work. However, the magnitudes of the odds ratios for the 
statistically significant interactions in Table 3 reveal that discretion more effectively improves 
associations between Work intensity and employee outcomes than it improves the Overtime 
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associations with employee outcomes. Thus, one might ask whether discretion helps employees 
bridge the discrepancies between the two types of work effort in terms of their unfavorable 
associations with the various outcomes. 
One straightforward way to explore this question is to calculate odds ratios for Overtime 
and Work intensity in employees with and without discretion. In Table 3, odds ratios for the main 
effects of Overtime and Work intensity represent effects for employees without discretion. Where 
effort-by-discretion interactions are statistically significant, odds ratios for employees with 
discretion can be obtained straightforwardly as OReffort*OReffort×discretion. Table A.4 in the Online 
Appendix gives all odds ratios estimated this way. In the Career model, odds ratios for Work 
intensity in employees with discretion converge towards the odds ratio for Overtime.7 In the 
Recognition model, odds ratios for Work intensity in employees with Work discretion converge 
towards the odds ratio for Overtime in employees without discretion. Instead, for Stress, Fatigue, 
Satisfaction, and Security, Work intensity with discretion remains a stronger predictor of 
unfavorable outcomes even when compared to Overtime without discretion. Therefore, even in 
employees with discretion, work intensity remains important relative to overtime work 
particularly for predicting well-being outcomes. This result underlines the importance of work 
intensity and nuances the role of discretion: while discretion may go some way toward alleviating 
unfavorable implications of work intensity, it may not fully resolve them. 
Robustness 
We assessed the robustness of our findings in two supplementary analyses.8 First, in the 
period of recovery after the Great Recession, working conditions in different countries, 
                                                 
    7 Post-hoc tests show that the respective odds ratios for Work intensity with Work discretion and Schedule 
discretion are statistically indistinguishable from 0.918, the odds ratio for Overtime (i.e., χ2[1df] = 0.2, p = 0.65, and 
χ2[1df] = 2.19, p = 0.14, respectively). 
    8 The results for these robustness checks are available from the authors on request. 
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industries, sectors, and occupations may have developed at different rates. We re-estimated 
models 1-5 (model 6 covers only 2015) in Tables 2 and 3 after including fixed effects for 
country-year, industry-year, sector-year, and occupation-year pairs. These additional fixed effects 
offer a flexible approach to account for heterogeneity in the development of working conditions 
from 2010 to 2015. Estimates were similar in magnitude and remained well determined. Thus, we 
believe our results do not spuriously reflect uneven developments in working conditions. 
Second, despite controls for a range of employee characteristics, it is possible that 
unobserved factors like ability may determine both effort and discretion as well as better career-
related opportunities. This possibility would bias our estimates if such factors remain unabsorbed 
by included controls. To examine this possibility, we included in models 4-6 of Tables 2 and 3 an 
additional variable for whether the employee’s salary increased in the past 12 months (1 = yes; 0 
= no). Wage increases tend to be serially correlated even after accounting for observable 
characteristics and so past wage growth may be interpreted as a shadow of latent ‘quality’ (Baker, 
Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994; Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Encouragingly, in these 
supplementary regressions, the results from Tables 2 and 3 replicate with only fractional 
differences in the effort and discretion coefficients and their precision. 
Occupational Differences in Employee Outcomes 
How are work effort and discretion associated with employee outcomes in different types 
of occupations? We examine this question by comparing upper- and lower-level occupations.9 
Table A.5 in the Online Appendix shows summary statistics for subsamples of high-skilled white 
collars and low-skilled blue collars. High-skilled white collars on average supply more overtime 
                                                 
    9 We have also undertaken a similar analysis for employees with contingent versus permanent contracts. The 
results of this supplementary analysis are available from the authors on request. 
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and have more discretion compared to low-skilled blue collars, while Work intensity is higher in 
low-skilled blue collars. 
[[Table 4 near here]] 
Table 4, Panel A, shows the main effects of Overtime and Work intensity in high-skilled 
white collars versus low-skilled blue collars. Overtime is less negatively associated with 
Satisfaction, Security, and Recognition in high-skilled white collars, while Work intensity shows 
a weaker association with Stress in such employees. Thus, the supply of effort may have more 
positive connotations in higher-level occupations, consistent with accounts of hard work being 
more normatively accepted as a practice among white collars (e.g., Ho 2009; Empson 2017). Yet, 
on aggregate all associations maintain the same sign and so work effort is persistently associated 
with greater Stress and Fatigue and lower Satisfaction, Career, Security, and Recognition. 
Panels B and C show estimates based on samples split by low-skilled blue collars and 
high-skilled white collars, which allows us to assess interactions between work effort and 
discretion for these separate sets of employees. For the subsample of low-skilled blue collars, 
Panel B shows that discretion does not modify any of the associations involving Overtime. 
However, consistent with the idea that work intensity is perhaps a more pressing concern in 
lower-level occupations (Kossek and Lautsch 2018), Work discretion improves associations of 
Work intensity with Satisfaction, Career, and Recognition.10 
Table 4, Panel C, shows that, in the subsample of high-skilled white collars, discretion 
improves several work effort associations with Stress, Satisfaction, Career, and Recognition, 
                                                 
    10 Work discretion increases the Work intensity association with Stress, yet the effect is less precisely determined 
and so, we believe, should not be over-interpreted. Given multiple predictors and outcomes, coefficients with t-
statistics close to the cut-off for statistical significance are best interpreted cautiously (Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf 
2010). 
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while Security is lower in employees with Schedule discretion working Overtime.11 The 
interaction between Overtime and Schedule discretion in model 4 is worth singling out because it 
shows a rare sign reversal, where the Overtime association with Career is positive (rather than 
less negative) given Schedule discretion. Schedule discretion does not modify any of the 
associations involving Work intensity. 
Overall, Table 4 suggests that discretion improves effort associations with outcomes in 
upper- and lower-level occupations alike, although relatively more so for work intensity in low-
skilled blue collars and overtime work in high-skilled white collars.12 These findings expand an, 
as yet, limited understanding of whether and how discretion practices have heterogeneous effects 
across occupations (Kossek and Lautsch 2018). 
Conclusion 
Our first objective has been to bridge the distinct literatures on the well-being and career-
related effects of work effort, by offering an integrative analysis of the implications of overtime 
work and work intensity for employee well-being and career-related outcomes. Using micro data 
on a random sample of 51,895 European employees across 2010 and 2015, we have shown that 
greater work effort is associated with reduced well-being and inferior career-related outcomes. 
These findings hold true even in upper-level occupations (Table 4, Panel A), where the ambiguity 
surrounding performance evaluation plausibly enhances the career-related outcomes of visible 
work effort. The work effort associations with well-being stand out as particularly substantial. 
Between types of work effort, work intensity generally is a stronger predictor of unfavorable 
outcomes than overtime work. These results align with prior evidence on the negative relation 
                                                 
    11 It is possible that job insecurity elicits greater overtime in employees with schedule discretion. With available 
data, our analyses cannot easily adjudicate between this and other narratives, an issue we return to in the Conclusion. 
    12 A pairwise statistical comparison of all effort-by-discretion interactions between low-skilled blue collars and 
high-skilled white collars gives results that are consistent with this conclusion. Table A.6 in the Online Appendix 
shows the χ2-statistics for these comparisons and their p-values. 
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between work effort and employee well-being. They also imply that the self-limiting and 
counterproductive tendencies of work effort, whether overtime work or work intensity, outweigh 
the role of work effort as a value-signaling device. Moreover, the magnitude of the work intensity 
effects converges with suggestions in the work intensification literature that work intensity may 
pose greater threats to employee well-being than overtime work (e.g., Green 2004a). 
Our second objective has been to examine how work effort associations with employee 
outcomes vary with the level of discretion given to employees. We have shown that discretion 
may reduce the adverse implications of work effort with respect to both well-being and career-
related outcomes, but work intensity generally remains a strong predictor of unfavorable 
outcomes even in employees with discretion. Moreover, discretion might be more effective in 
helping high-skilled white collars deal with overtime work, and low-skilled blue collars with 
work intensity. These findings contribute to a more comprehensive view of the role of discretion 
in conditioning a broader set of outcomes beyond employee well-being. 
 Our analyses are based on observational data in a pooled cross section and so our findings 
must be treated cautiously. First, selectivity is a concern. Work effort and the availability of 
discretion vary systematically across employees, and their determinants might correlate with 
well-being and career-related outcomes. Our models contain a large number of controls for such 
confounding influences, yet it remains possible that relevant employee differences are omitted. 
Second, causality may operate from outcomes to work effort and discretion, an issue perhaps 
more pressing in the models for career-related outcomes: employees with limited career potential 
might experience more pressure to work hard, while ones with greater potential might more 
readily receive discretion. 
We are reassured by essentially unaltered estimates in supplementary specifications 
controlling for past wage growth, and by the absence of systematic differences in the work 
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intensity associations with career-related outcomes between high-skilled white collars and low-
skilled blue collars. The latter is an unlikely result in the presence of consequential reverse 
causality from career potential to work effort, given that low-skilled blue collars with nowhere to 
go would be relatively more vulnerable to supervisory pressures for intense work. Longitudinal 
studies will be important to help address issues of unobserved heterogeneity. To establish cause 
and effect, scholars may also exploit exogenous shifts in labor regulations, some of which might 
change work effort without changing relevant outcomes per se. 
Although we cannot draw definite causal inferences due to the empirical challenges that 
remain, our results certainly do not deny the possibility that work effort and discretion affect 
employee outcomes. In this vein, we explore some possible implications. Oftentimes, workers 
both complain and boast about excessive work effort (evidence for professionals abound—e.g., 
Ho 2009; Empson 2017), perhaps because they accept inferior well-being while anticipating 
career-related progress. Our results could imply that the latter might not materialize. If overtime 
work and work intensity pose challenges not just for well-being but also career-related outcomes, 
then employees must become more aware of the broader limitations of excessive work effort. The 
possible limitations of work effort also have implications for employers, who may worry about 
productivity and quality issues. Our findings foreshadow that greater discretion should be given 
when viable, and certainly where high levels of work effort are likely or unavoidable. 
Governments have long recognized the issues involved in extensive work effort, for 
example, by imposing restrictions on standard working hours. And countries such as France and 
Italy have passed laws giving employees a right to disconnect from work. Some employers have 
followed suit by setting limits to out-of-hours communications. While all such initiatives concern 
the duration of work, our findings would imply that the intensity of work might have more severe 
ramifications for employees. This indicates a need for greater awareness of such potential effects 
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among employers and policy makers, and for greater attention to strategies that may help relieve 
employees of undue exposure to intensive work. This is challenging not least because the 
evaluation of work intensity is complex relative to work duration. Suitable initiatives will take 
time to unfold (Lehndorff 2014) and may encounter resistance (Kellogg 2011), yet we believe 
they merit genuine consideration. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
  2010  2015  2010-2015          
  N=25,356  N=26,539  N=51,895          
 Variable Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Stress  1.87 1.15  1.92 1.14  1.90 1.15                   
2 Fatigue 0.42 0.49  0.40 0.49  0.41 0.49 0.21                 
3 Satisfaction  2.00 0.71  2.06 0.69  2.03 0.70 -0.22 -0.23               
4 Career 1.76 1.18  1.95 1.35  1.86 1.28 -0.03 -0.11 0.34             
5 Security 2.70 1.23  2.91 1.29  2.81 1.27 -0.05 -0.09 0.27 0.15           
6 Recognition 
(N=26,462) 
― ―  2.61 1.17  ― ― -0.20 -0.18 0.50 0.44 0.20         
7 Overtime 0.94 1.16  0.73 1.01  0.83 1.09 0.21 0.10 -0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.04       
8 Work intensity 2.65 1.83  2.72 1.84  2.69 1.84 0.34 0.14 -0.18 -0.01 -0.09 -0.13 0.13     
9 Work discretion 0.65 0.39  0.66 0.39  0.65 0.39 -0.01 -0.02 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.13 -0.10   
10 Schedule discretion 0.41 0.35  0.43 0.36  0.42 0.35 -0.03 -0.07 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.12 -0.08 0.34 
11 Employer-provided 
training 
0.35 0.48  0.39 0.49  0.37 0.48 0.09 -0.02 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.14 
12 Employee-funded 
training 
0.06 0.24  0.07 0.25  0.06 0.25 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.06 
13 On-the-job training 0.37 0.48  0.38 0.49  0.38 0.48 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.09 
14 Task rotation 0.51 0.50  0.52 0.50  0.52 0.50 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.02 
15 Productivity pay 0.13 0.33  0.11 0.32  0.12 0.32 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.02 
16 Teamwork 0.65 0.48  0.62 0.48  0.64 0.48 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 
17 Paid overtime 0.32 0.47  0.34 0.48  0.33 0.47 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.01 
18 Pace of work 
dependent on 
colleagues 
0.49 0.50  0.47 0.50  0.48 0.50 0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.25 -0.05 
19 Pace of work 
dependent on 
equipment 
0.18 0.39  0.20 0.40  0.19 0.39 0.04 0.05 -0.11 -0.04 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.25 -0.17 
20 Task uncertainty 1.24 0.94  1.25 0.91  1.24 0.93 0.24 0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.07 0.23 0.22 0.16 
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21 Male 0.50 0.50  0.49 0.50  0.49 0.50 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.03 
22 Age 40.72 11.35  41.55 11.64  41.14 11.50 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.09 0.05 
23 Log firm tenure 9.72 9.52  9.67 9.55  9.69 9.53 0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.19 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.06 
24 Log subordinates 2.36 25.13  2.13 21.64  2.24 23.41 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 
 
 Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
11 Employer-provided training 0.11                           
12 Employee-funded training 0.01 0.09                         
13 On-the-job training 0.08 0.43 0.09                       
14 Task rotation -0.04 0.09 0.02 0.14                     
15 Productivity pay 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01                   
16 Teamwork 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.39 0.00                 
17 Paid overtime -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.06               
18 Pace of work dependent on colleagues -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.07             
19 Pace of work dependent on equipment -0.13 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.20           
20 Task uncertainty 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.17 -0.05 0.15 0.02 0.15 -0.02         
21 Male 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.08 0.14 -0.06       
22 Age 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02     
23 Log firm tenure 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.56   
24 Log subordinates 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
    Notes: Correlations are for the pooled sample (2010-2015), except correlations involving Recognition (row/column (6)), which are for available observations in 
2015 (N=26,462). To conserve space, correlations involving fixed effects for countries, industries, sectors, occupations, education levels, contract types, and 
establishment sizes are omitted. 
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Table 2. Regression Estimates for Employee Well-Being and Career-Related Outcomes 
 Employee well-being  Career-related outcomes 
 Ordered logit Binary logit Ordered logit  Ordered logit 
 Stress Fatigue Satisfaction  Career Security Recognition 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Variable β OR β OR β OR  β OR β OR β OR 
Overtime 0.238*** 1.608 0.183*** 1.440 -0.159*** 0.728  -0.040*** 0.924 -0.042*** 0.920 -0.157*** 0.729 
 [24.290]  [16.277]  [-14.710]   [-3.641]  [-3.983]  [-11.004]  
Work intensity 0.331*** 6.166 0.143*** 2.199 -0.150*** 0.439  -0.021*** 0.890 -0.069*** 0.683 -0.100*** 0.578 
 [36.925]  [21.733]  [-23.352]   [-3.400]  [-12.147]  [-12.076]  
Work discretion -0.170*** 0.844 0.014 1.014 0.490*** 1.633  0.392*** 1.480 0.292*** 1.339 0.455*** 1.576 
 [-6.370]  [0.412]  [18.366]   [13.642]  [10.301]  [12.889]  
Schedule discretion -0.234*** 0.791 -0.106** 0.900 0.614*** 1.848  0.396*** 1.486 0.269*** 1.309 0.620*** 1.858 
 [-7.655]  [-3.161]  [17.713]   [11.535]  [8.625]  [15.626]  
Employer-provided  0.086*** 1.089 -0.025 0.975 0.225*** 1.252  0.354*** 1.424 0.180*** 1.197 0.243*** 1.275 
training [4.146]  [-1.038]  [10.102]   [15.829]  [8.620]  [8.150]  
Employee-funded  0.117*** 1.124 0.084* 1.087 -0.038 0.962  0.029 1.030 -0.189*** 0.827 -0.127** 0.881 
traininga [3.548]  [2.069]  [-0.987]   [0.755]  [-5.327]  [-2.656]  
On-the-job training 0.012 1.012 0.080*** 1.083 0.126*** 1.134  0.228*** 1.256 0.012 1.012 0.167*** 1.182 
 [0.684]  [3.365]  [5.434]   [10.451]  [0.527]  [6.280]  
Task rotation 0.071*** 1.073 0.110*** 1.116 -0.057** 0.944  0.005 1.005 0.009 1.009 0.005 1.005 
 [3.718]  [4.730]  [-2.667]   [0.232]  [0.447]  [0.183]  
Productivity pay 0.016 1.016 0.011 1.011 0.021 1.021  0.138*** 1.148 -0.065* 0.937 0.124** 1.132 
 [0.539]  [0.288]  [0.676]   [4.761]  [-2.168]  [2.964]  
Teamwork -0.007 0.993 0.017 1.017 0.129*** 1.137  0.178*** 1.195 0.069*** 1.071 0.185*** 1.203 
 [-0.324]  [0.687]  [6.082]   [8.915]  [3.692]  [6.537]  
Paid overtime -0.019 0.981 0.050* 1.051 0.143*** 1.154  0.258*** 1.294 0.142*** 1.152 0.122*** 1.130 
 [-1.012]  [2.163]  [6.431]   [11.950]  [7.477]  [3.822]  
Pace of work dependent  0.098*** 1.103 0.042 1.043 -0.090*** 0.914  0.038* 1.038 -0.111*** 0.895 -0.075** 0.928 
on colleagues [5.332]  [1.664]  [-4.536]   [2.294]  [-5.931]  [-2.992]  
Pace of work dependent  -0.009 0.991 0.054 1.056 -0.053* 0.948  0.032 1.032 -0.045 0.956 -0.029 0.971 
on equipment [-0.359]  [1.919]  [-2.030]   [1.195]  [-1.897]  [-0.838]  
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Task uncertainty 0.319*** 2.605 0.213*** 1.893 -0.219*** 0.518  -0.130*** 0.677 -0.065*** 0.823 -0.221*** 0.514 
 [24.904]  [15.925]  [-16.015]   [-11.374]  [-5.596]  [-14.109]  
Male -0.107*** 0.898 -0.334*** 0.716 -0.037 0.964  0.180*** 1.198 -0.058** 0.944 -0.046 0.956 
 [-5.362]  [-14.465]  [-1.706]   [8.334]  [-2.669]  [-1.799]  
Age 0.046*** 4.348 0.033*** 2.915 -0.048*** 0.214  -0.043*** 0.253 -0.060*** 0.148 -0.053*** 0.181 
 [7.656]  [4.264]  [-7.405]   [-6.645]  [-9.445]  [-6.538]  
Age squared -0.001*** 0.072 -0.000*** 1.000 0.001*** 13.77  0.000* 1.000 0.001*** 13.77 0.001*** 13.77 
 [-8.024]  [-3.320]  [6.549]   [2.233]  [7.956]  [6.237]  
Log firm tenure 0.117*** 1.457 0.006 1.019 -0.010 0.968  -0.048*** 0.856 0.310*** 2.716 -0.046** 0.862 
 [9.840]  [0.474]  [-0.730]   [-3.636]  [21.131]  [-2.608]  
Log subordinates 0.045*** 1.051 -0.082*** 0.914 0.153*** 1.183  0.236*** 1.296 0.056*** 1.063 0.138*** 1.164 
 [3.752]  [-5.574]  [11.905]   [17.841]  [4.324]  [8.043]  
Year 2015 0.086*** 1.090 -0.036 0.965 0.161*** 1.175  0.272*** 1.312 0.493*** 1.637 ― ― 
 [3.975]  [-1.113]  [5.749]   [10.095]  [16.312]  ―  
Fixed effectsb Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Log pseudolikelihood -70,708 -31,304 -49,014  -76,055 -68,711 -36,460 
Number of observations 51,895 51,895 51,895  51,895 51,895 26,462 
    Notes: *Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level; *** at the .001 level. β are beta coefficients from ordered (models 1, 3-6) and binary (model 2) logit 
regressions, with t-statistics in brackets, based on robust standard errors clustered by country × industry pairs. OR are odds ratios associated with an increase in each 
predictor from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile. Relevant percentiles and unstandardized odds ratios (i.e., exp[β]) are given in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Online 
Appendix. Estimates in models 1 to 5 are for the pooled sample (2010-2015); estimates in model 6 are for 2015. 
    a. The 10th and 90th percentiles of Employee-funded training are identical and so its odds ratios are given for the 94th relative to the 10th percentile. 
    b. Fixed effects are for counties (35), industries (16), sectors (4), occupations (9), education levels (6), contract types (5), and establishment sizes (2). 
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Table 3. Regression Estimates for Employee Well-Being and Career-Related Outcomes: 
Work Effort Interactions with Discretion 
 Employee well-being  Career-related outcomes 
 Ordered logit Binary logit Ordered logit  Ordered logit 
 Stress Fatigue Satisfaction  Career Security Recognition 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Variable β OR β OR β OR  β OR β OR β OR 
Overtime 0.280*** 1.750 0.245*** 1.633 -0.221*** 0.643  -0.043* 0.918 -0.060** 0.885 -0.213*** 0.654 
 [14.365]  [9.810]  [-9.856]   [-2.290]  [-3.047]  [-7.440]  
Work intensity 0.353*** 6.960 0.173*** 2.591 -0.214*** 0.310  -0.103*** 0.567 -0.087*** 0.621 -0.153*** 0.431 
 [24.267]  [15.301]  [-18.007]   [-9.415]  [-8.742]  [-10.694]  
Work discretion -0.070 0.932 0.132* 1.141 0.243*** 1.276  0.159*** 1.173 0.189*** 1.209 0.215*** 1.239 
 [-1.491]  [2.465]  [5.539]   [3.640]  [4.246]  [3.674]  
Schedule discretion -0.172*** 0.842 0.024 1.024 0.461*** 1.586  0.199*** 1.220 0.281*** 1.324 0.551*** 1.734 
 [-3.302]  [0.389]  [8.026]   [3.661]  [5.146]  [8.052]  
Overtime × Work  -0.052* 0.901 -0.086** 0.841 0.074** 1.160  -0.020 0.962 0.057* 1.121 0.088** 1.192 
discretion [-2.267]  [-2.935]  [2.859]   [-0.801]  [2.393]  [2.738]  
Overtime ×  -0.013 0.974 -0.004 0.992 0.021 1.044  0.035 1.071 -0.049 0.906 -0.017 0.966 
Schedule discretion  [-0.579]  [-0.128]  [0.829]   [1.420]  [-1.815]  [-0.507]  
Work intensity ×  -0.024 0.875 -0.021 0.895 0.073*** 1.496  0.093*** 1.672 0.022 1.133 0.069*** 1.458 
Work discretion [-1.604]  [-1.432]  [5.203]   [6.976]  [1.633]  [3.602]  
Work intensity ×  -0.018 0.905 -0.045** 0.781 0.048** 1.308  0.060*** 1.392 0.012 1.068 0.029 1.177 
Schedule discretion [-1.191]  [-2.691]  [2.792]   [3.622]  [0.788]  [1.483]  
Controlsa Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Log 
pseudolikelihood -70,698 -31,290 -48,972  -75,995 -68,703 -36,442 
Number of 
observations 51,895 51,895 51,895  51,895 51,895 26,462 
    Notes: *Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level; *** at the .001 level. β are beta coefficients from ordered (models 1, 3-6) and binary (model 2) logit 
regressions, with t-statistics in brackets, based on robust standard errors clustered by country × industry pairs. OR are odds ratios associated with an increase in each predictor from 
its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile. Relevant percentiles are given in Table A.2 in the Online Appendix. Coefficients and odds ratios for the main effects of Overtime and Work 
intensity represent effects for employees without discretion. Estimates in models 1 to 5 are for the pooled sample (2010-2015); estimates in column 6 are for 2015. 
    a. All models include the same set of control variables as in Table 2. 
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Table 4. Regression Estimates for Employee Well-Being and Career-Related Outcomes: 
Results for High-Skilled White Collars versus Low-Skilled Blue Collars 
 
 Employee well-being  Career-related outcomes 
 
Ordered 
logit 
 
Stress 
Binary 
logit 
 
Fatigue 
Ordered 
logit 
 
Satisfac 
tion 
 
 
 
 
Career 
Ordered 
logit 
 
Security 
 
 
 
Recogni 
tion 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Panel A: Full sample   
Overtime 0.248*** 0.176*** -0.175***  -0.023 -0.063*** -0.197*** 
 [17.550] [13.004] [-12.663]  [-1.683] [-4.925] [-9.465] 
Work intensity 0.358*** 0.137*** -0.151***  -0.025*** -0.072*** -0.109*** 
 [33.164] [17.052] [-18.987]  [-3.294] [-10.925] [-10.359] 
High-skilled white collara 0.552*** -0.253*** 0.469***  0.917*** 0.080 0.180** 
 [11.172] [-4.946] [9.858]  [17.453] [1.879] [3.026] 
Overtime × High-skilled white  -0.011 0.012 0.039*  -0.022 0.050* 0.083** 
collara [-0.609] [0.556] [2.205]  [-1.164] [2.531] [2.987] 
Work intensity × High-skilled  -0.073*** 0.017 0.003  0.009 0.009 0.025 
white collara [-5.826] [1.327] [0.223]  [0.772] [0.864] [1.600] 
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Number of observations 51,895 51,895 51,895  51,895 51,895 26,462 
        
Panel B: Subsample of low-skilled blue collars 
Overtime 0.197*** 0.173*** -0.115*  -0.005 -0.113** -0.188** 
 [5.237] [3.715] [-2.428]  [-0.133] [-2.973] [-3.095] 
Work intensity 0.351*** 0.174*** -0.241***  -0.158*** -0.106*** -0.187*** 
 [15.907] [7.758] [-10.876]  [-8.028] [-5.651] [-7.278] 
Work discretion -0.247** 0.097 0.195  -0.050 0.212* -0.066 
 [-2.684] [0.812] [1.884]  [-0.503] [2.093] [-0.497] 
Schedule discretion -0.082 0.066 0.390**  0.097 0.207 0.755*** 
 [-0.680] [0.467] [2.679]  [0.729] [1.516] [4.251] 
Overtime × Work discretion 0.030 -0.000 -0.111  0.030 -0.003 0.038 
 [0.551] [-0.004] [-1.801]  [0.544] [-0.055] [0.410] 
Overtime × Schedule  0.030 -0.058 0.107  0.022 0.088 0.120 
discretion [0.455] [-0.688] [1.355]  [0.330] [1.224] [0.997] 
Work intensity × Work  0.056* -0.001 0.071**  0.111*** 0.024 0.115* 
discretion [2.016] [-0.024] [2.580]  [4.288] [0.852] [2.463] 
Work intensity × Schedule  -0.064 -0.080* 0.078  0.124*** 0.004 -0.014 
discretion [-1.661] [-2.188] [1.827]  [3.359] [0.093] [-0.265] 
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Number of observations 9,242 9,242 9,242  9,242 9,242 4,494 
        
Panel C: Subsample of high-skilled white collars 
Overtime 0.310*** 0.215*** -0.219***  -0.019 0.014 -0.218*** 
 [8.410] [5.515] [-5.470]  [-0.586] [0.421] [-4.431] 
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Work intensity 0.336*** 0.188*** -0.248***  -0.094*** -0.092*** -0.183*** 
 [13.115] [7.386] [-10.922]  [-4.128] [-4.231] [-6.153] 
Work discretion 0.020 0.093 0.159  0.225** 0.261** 0.092 
 [0.240] [0.908] [1.925]  [2.929] [3.246] [0.789] 
Schedule discretion -0.283** -0.082 0.331***  0.099 0.287*** 0.358** 
 [-3.131] [-0.779] [3.941]  [1.273] [3.507] [3.291] 
Overtime × Work discretion -0.098* -0.068 0.115**  -0.056 0.020 0.149** 
 [-2.457] [-1.547] [2.734]  [-1.510] [0.582] [2.627] 
Overtime × Schedule  0.042 0.061 0.004  0.099*** -0.098** -0.010 
discretion [1.399] [1.447] [0.088]  [3.400] [-2.966] [-0.203] 
Work intensity × Work  -0.013 -0.033 0.117***  0.103*** 0.025 0.094** 
discretion [-0.473] [-1.148] [4.233]  [3.877] [1.009] [2.649] 
Work intensity × Schedule  0.001 -0.031 0.050  0.027 0.015 0.046 
discretion [0.056] [-1.198] [1.897]  [1.078] [0.665] [1.473] 
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Number of observations 19,911 19,911 19,911  19,911 19,911 10,221 
    Notes: *Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level; *** at the .001 level. Coefficients are from 
ordered (models 1, 3-6) and binary (model 2) logit regressions, with t-statistics in brackets, based on robust standard 
errors clustered by country × industry pairs. Each column contains three separate models, one estimated for the full 
sample, one for the subsample of low-skilled blue collars, and one for the subsample of high-skilled white collars. 
Low-skilled blue collars are plant and machine operators and assemblers and individuals in elementary occupations 
(ISCO88 codes 8 and 9). High-skilled white collars are legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, 
technicians, and associate professionals (ISCO88 codes 1, 2, and 3). Estimates in columns (1) to (5) are for the 
pooled sample (2010-2015); estimates in column (6) are for 2015. 
    a. High-skilled white collar is a dummy variable set to 1 for legislators, senior officials and managers, 
professionals, technicians, and associate professionals (ISCO88 codes 1, 2, and 3), and 0 otherwise. 
    b. Except for occupation fixed effects, all models include control variables as in Table 2. Models of panel A also 
include fixed effects for ISCO88 codes 4-7 and 10 and so coefficients on High-skilled white collar are relative to 
low-skilled blue collars. Due to collinearity, an ordinal measure for education level substitutes education level fixed 
effects in column (6) of panel C. 
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
   Question # 
Variable Question(s) Scales EWCS 2010 EWCS 2015 
Stress  You experience stress in your work 0 (never) - 4 (always) 51N 61M 
Fatigue Over the last 12 months, did you suffer from overall 
fatigue? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 69L 78I 
Satisfaction  On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with working conditions in 
your main paid job? 
0 (not at all satisfied) - 3 (very 
satisfied) 
76 88 
Career My job offers good prospects for career advancement 0 (strongly disagree) - 4 (strongly 
agree) 
77C 89B 
Security I might lose my job in the next 6 months 0 (strongly agree) - 4 (strongly 
disagree) 
77A 89G 
Recognition I receive the recognition I deserve for my work 0 (strongly disagree) - 4 (strongly 
agree) 
― 89C 
Overtime Over the last 12 months, how often have you worked in 
your free time to meet work demands? 
0 (never) - 4 (every day) 42 46 
Work intensity Simple average of answers to: 
   
 
Does your job involve working at very high speed? 0 (never) - 6 (all of the time) 45A 49A 
 
Does your job involve working to tight deadlines? 0 (never) - 6 (all of the time) 45B 49B 
Work discretion Simple average of answers to: 
   
 
Are you able to choose or change your order of tasks? 0 = no; 1 = yes 50A 54A 
 
Are you able to choose or change your methods of 
work? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 50B 54B 
 
Are you able to choose or change your speed or rate of 
work? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 50C 54C 
Schedule discretion Simple average of answers to: 
   
 
Can you adapt or entirely determine your working 
hours? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 39 42 
 
You can take a break when you wish 0 = rarely or never; 1 = sometimes 
or always 
51F 61F 
38 
 
Employer-provided training Over the past 12 months, have you undergone training 
paid for or provided by your employer to improve your 
skills? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 61A 65A 
Employee-funded training Over the past 12 months, have you undergone training 
paid for by yourself to improve your skills? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 61B 65B 
On-the-job training Over the past 12 months, have you undergone on-the-job 
training to improve your skills? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 61C 65C 
Task rotation Does your job involve rotating tasks between yourself 
and colleagues? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 53 55 
Productivity pay Do the earnings from your main job include piece rate or 
productivity payments? 
0 = no; 1 = yes EF7B 101B 
Teamwork Do you work in a group or team that has common tasks 
and can plan its work? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 56 58 
Paid overtime Do the earnings from your main job include extra 
payments for additional hours of work/overtime? 
0 = no; 1 = yes EF7C 101C 
Pace of work dependent on 
colleagues 
On the whole, is your pace of work dependent on the 
work done by colleagues? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 46A 50A 
Pace of work dependent on 
equipment 
On the whole, is your pace of work dependent on the 
automatic speed of a machine or movement of a 
product? 
0 = no; 1 = yes 46D 50D 
Task uncertainty How often do you have to interrupt a task you are doing 
in order to take on an unforeseen task? 
0 (never) - 3 (very often) 47 51 
Male Gender 0 = female; 1 = male HH2a 2a 
Age Age in years Continuous HH2b 2b 
Log firm tenure Natural logarithm of answer (+1) to: 
   
 
How many years have you been in your company or 
organization? 
Continuous 12 17 
Log subordinates Natural logarithm of answer (+1) to: 
   
 
How many people work under your supervision, for 
whom pay increases, bonuses or promotion depend 
directly on you? 
Continuous 17 23 
Year 2015 Survey year 0 = 2010; 1 = 2015 ― ― 
Country Dummy variables for country of interview 
 
― ― 
Industry Dummy variables for one-digit NACE industry sections 
 
9 13 
39 
 
Sector Dummy variables for private, public, joint private-
public, not-for-profit, and other sectors 
 
10 14 
Occupation Dummy variables for one-digit ISCO88 occupations 
 
2, 3 5, 6 
Education level Dummy variables for one-digit ISCED education levels 
 
EF1 106 
Contract type Dummy variables for permanent contract, fixed term 
contract, temporary employment agency contract, 
apprenticeship or other training scheme, no contract, and 
other contract 
 
7 11 
Establishment size Dummy variables for establishments with 2-9, 10-249, 
and 250+ employees 
 
11 16a, 16b 
    Notes: All variables are based on the fifth and sixth European Working Condition Surveys (EWCS 2010 and EWCS 2015). The last two columns refer to the 
specific questions in the two surveys. 
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Table A.2. 10th and 90th Percentiles for Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable 10th Percentile 90th Percentile 
Overtime 0 2 
Work intensity 0 5.5 
Work discretion 0 1 
Schedule discretion 0 1 
Employer-provided training 0 1 
Employee-funded training 0 0 
On-the-job training 0 1 
Task rotation 0 1 
Productivity pay 0 1 
Teamwork 0 1 
Paid overtime 0 1 
Pace of work dependent on colleagues 0 1 
Pace of work dependent on equipment 0 1 
Task uncertainty 0 3 
Male 0 1 
Age 25 57 
Age squared 625 3,249 
Log firm tenure 0 3.219 
Log subordinates 0 1.099 
Year 2015 0 1 
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Table A.3. Unstandardized Odds Ratios for Estimates in Table 2 
 
  Employee well-being  Career-related outcomes 
  Ordered logit 
Binary 
logit 
Ordered 
logit 
 Ordered logit 
  Stress Fatigue Satisfac tion 
 Career Security Recognition 
Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Overtime 1.268 1.200 0.853 0.961 0.959 0.854 
Work intensity 1.392 1.154 0.861 0.979 0.933 0.905 
Work discretion 0.844 1.014 1.633 1.480 1.339 1.576 
Schedule discretion 0.791 0.900 1.848 1.486 1.309 1.858 
Employer-provided training 1.089 0.975 1.252 1.424 1.197 1.275 
Employee-funded training 1.124 1.087 0.962 1.030 0.827 0.881 
On-the-job training 1.012 1.083 1.134 1.256 1.012 1.182 
Task rotation 1.073 1.116 0.944 1.005 1.009 1.005 
Productivity pay 1.016 1.011 1.021 1.148 0.937 1.132 
Teamwork 0.993 1.017 1.137 1.195 1.071 1.203 
Paid overtime 0.981 1.051 1.154 1.294 1.152 1.130 
Pace of work dependent on 
colleagues 1.103 1.043 0.914 1.038 0.895 0.928 
Pace of work dependent on 
equipment 0.991 1.056 0.948 1.032 0.956 0.971 
Task uncertainty 1.376 1.237 0.803 0.878 0.937 0.801 
Male 0.898 0.716 0.964 1.198 0.944 0.956 
Age 1.047 1.034 0.953 0.958 0.942 0.948 
Age squared 0.999 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001 1.001 
Log firm tenure 1.124 1.006 0.990 0.953 1.364 0.955 
Log subordinates 1.046 0.921 1.165 1.266 1.057 1.148 
Year 2015 1.090 0.965 1.175 1.312 1.637 ― 
    Notes: Unstandardized odds ratios are shown, calculated as exp[β], based on the β coefficients in Table 2. 
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Table A.4. Odds Ratios for Overtime and Work Intensity in Employees with/without Discretion 
 
    Employee well-being   Career-related outcomes 
    Ordered logit Binary logit Ordered logit   Ordered logit 
    Stress Fatigue Satisfaction    Career Security Recognition 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Overtime         
 
    
  Without discretion 1.750 1.633 0.643   0.918 0.885 0.654 
  With Work discretion 1.577 1.373 0.746   0.918 0.993 0.780 
  With Schedule discretion 1.750 1.633 0.643   0.918 0.885 0.654 
Work intensity             
  Without discretion 6.960 2.591 0.310   0.567 0.621 0.431 
  With Work discretion 6.960 2.591 0.463   0.948 0.621 0.628 
  With Schedule discretion 6.960 2.024 0.405   0.789 0.621 0.431 
    Notes: Values are odds ratios associated with an increase in each predictor from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile. For 
interactions that are indistinguishable from 0 at the 95% level, odds ratios with discretion are equal to odds ratios without 
discretion. All predictions are based on the estimates in Table 3. 
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Table A.5. Summary Statistics by Occupationa 
 
 High-skilled white collars Low-skilled blue collars 
 (N=19,911) (N=9,242) 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD 
Stress 2.05 1.07 1.71 1.25 
Fatigue 0.40 0.49 0.44 0.5 
Satisfaction 2.16 0.66 1.85 0.74 
Career 2.22 1.22 1.35 1.22 
Security 3.05 1.18 2.55 1.33 
Recognitionb 2.77 1.09 2.38 1.25 
Overtime 1.18 1.21 0.57 0.94 
Work intensity 2.55 1.75 2.88 1.96 
Work discretion 0.78 0.33 0.51 0.42 
Schedule discretion 0.52 0.38 0.32 0.31 
    a. High-skilled white collars are legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians, and 
associate professionals (ISCO88 codes 1, 2, and 3). Low-skilled blue collars are plant and machine operators and 
assemblers and elementary occupations (ISCO88 codes 8 and 9). 
    b. Recognition is available only in EWCS 2015 and so sample sizes are N=10,221 for high-skilled white collars 
and N=4,494 for low-skilled blue collars. 
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Table A.6. Tests of Differences in Effort-by-Discretion Interactions between Low-Skilled Blue 
Collars and High-Skilled White Collars 
 
  Stress Fatigue Satisfaction Career Security Recognition 
Overtime × Work discretion 3.56 0.74 9.71 1.60 0.12 1.08 
  [0.059] [0.390] [0.002] [0.205] [0.731] [0.299] 
Overtime × Schedule discretion 0.03 1.54 1.25 1.07 5.48 1.00 
  [0.874] [0.214] [0.263] [0.301] [0.019] [0.318] 
Work intensity × Work discretion 2.98 0.55 1.33 0.05 0.00 0.12 
  [0.084] [0.458] [0.248] [0.820] [0.977] [0.730] 
Work intensity × Schedule discretion 2.03 1.23 0.31 4.69 0.06 1.01 
  [0.155] [0.268] [0.577] [0.030] [0.812] [0.315] 
    Notes: χ2-statistics (1df) are shown, with p-values in brackets, testing differences in the magnitudes of the 
effort-by-discretion interactions across models for low-skilled blue collars (Table 4, Panel B) and high-skilled 
white collars (Table 4, Panel C).  
 
